Corporate Governance, Intellectual Capital and Financial Performance of Banks listed in Pakistan Stock Exchange by Iqbal, Javed & Zaib, Jahan
www.ssoar.info
Corporate Governance, Intellectual Capital and
Financial Performance of Banks listed in Pakistan
Stock Exchange
Iqbal, Javed; Zaib, Jahan
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Iqbal, J., & Zaib, J. (2017). Corporate Governance, Intellectual Capital and Financial Performance of Banks listed in
Pakistan Stock Exchange. Pakistan Administrative Review, 1(3), 175-196. https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-
ssoar-55491-9
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer CC BY Lizenz (Namensnennung) zur
Verfügung gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zu den CC-Lizenzen finden
Sie hier:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/deed.de
Terms of use:
This document is made available under a CC BY Licence
(Attribution). For more Information see:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
Pakistan Administrative Review 
Vol. 1, No. 3, 2017 
 
Copyright@2017 by the authors. This is an open access article distributed under terms and conditions of the 
Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license (http://creativecommons.org/license/by/4.0) 
 
Corporate Governance, Intellectual Capital and Financial 
Performance of Banks listed in Pakistan Stock Exchange 
 
Javed Iqbal 
Assistant Professor 
Department of Economics 
Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad. 
email: javed@qau.edu.pk 
 
Jahan Zaib 
MPhil Scholar,  
Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad.  
email: jan00039@gmail.com 
 
Abstract: This study aims to examine the impact of Corporate Governance (CG) and 
Intellectual Capital (IC) on financial performance in banks listed in Pakistan stock exchange. 
Due to the different scope of business, the banks are dived into two groups – Commercial banks 
and Microfinance & investment banks, and analyzed their data separately.  We have used 
Generalized Least Squared (GLS) model to examine the impact of Corporate Governance and 
Intellectual Capital, and then impact of Intellectual capital on financial performance. The results 
show that Corporate Governance has significant impact on intellectual capital in both groups of 
banks. Board ownership has positive significant coefficient only in case of microfinance & 
investment banks, while Board size and Board independence significantly improve intellectual 
capital efficiency in case of both types of banks. Human capital efficiency significantly effects 
financial performance in Microfinance and investment banks, whereas commercial banks 
improve their financial performance through structural capital efficiency. 
 
Keywords: Intellectual Capital, Corporate Governance, Commercial Banks, Microfinance & 
Investment Banks 
 
Reference: Reference to this article should be made as Iqbal, J. & Zeb, J. (2017). Corporate 
governance, intellectual capital and financial performance of banks listed in Pakistan stock 
exchange. Pakistan Administrative Review, 1(3), 175-196.  
 
1. Introduction 
Economic and financial crises in Asia and some corporate scandals like Enron, WorldCom and 
Marconi bend the focus of researchers towards corporate governance. It can be concluded that 
performance of companies strongly depend upon their governance and a country is economically 
sound if all industries in that country are well managed and have good governance. Many 
corporations face failure due to weak corporate governance. Therefore, corporate governance 
attracts the attention of investors and regulators. Well organized and improved governance 
becomes a key factor to compete and survive in the world of competition. 
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Good corporate governance practices not only assure the success of individual firms but also 
give momentum to development of the economy of a country (Laporta et al., 2000). Therefore, 
countries are engaged in promoting good corporate governance and making various policies and 
procedures to monitor quality of governance. Many studies like Claessens (2000), La porta et al. 
(1993, 2000, 2002) and Wilks (2004) contributes toward identification and solution of various 
problems related to corporate governance. According to Shelfer (1997), governance mechanisms 
have become more complex with development in technology, establishment of global markets 
and no restrictions on ownership. Multinational ownership creates more complexity in corporate 
governance and increase in size of business need to involve more intermediaries, which raises 
more issues (Claessence, 2000). Keeping in view the corporate governance challenges and the 
need for regulations, different countries issued their own code of corporate governance, 
according to their environment and requirements.  
After the Asian financial crises of 1998, governments paid special attention and introduced 
separate authorities to regulate corporate sector with the assistance of World Bank and 
management of companies. Like other countries, Pakistan also continuously focuses on the 
effectiveness of corporate governance. In Pakistan, a proper code of corporate governance was 
first time issued by the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP) in 2002, which 
was later amended in 2012. 
Corporate governance has attained much prominence in the recent literature; however, despite 
much attention it has been observed that companies having same governance mechanisms show 
different performances mainly due to their structures and policies (Thomsen, 2005). Corporate 
governance mechanism is directly linked with corporate policies and decisions, which influences 
performance (Sullivan, 2000). This performance is directly linked to the intellectual assets of an 
organization. However, the challenge, organizations face is related to the improvements in their 
intellectual assets. Firms need to know efficiency of different components of intellectual capital 
and its impact on financial performance.  
Empirical studies conducted in developed and emerging economies show that CG has significant 
impact of financial performance. Most of the studies included different countries or made a pool 
of different sectors, this causes a serious heterogeneity in the data because different countries 
have different codes of corporate governance, and different sectors have different business 
structures. Similarly, the practices of intellectual capital are mainly seen in developed countries. 
There are ample studies on IC and financial performance. For the past decade developing 
countries are also showing keen interest towards intellectual capital. In case of Pakistan, there is 
dearth of literature to investigate the association of intellectual capital with financial 
performance. A study conducted by Makki and Lodhi (2014) in Pakistani context found that IC 
plays mediating role between CG and financial performance by using data of listed companies in 
Karachi stock exchange.  
The present study investigates corporate governance, intellectual capital and financial 
performance of banks listed on Pakistan Stock Exchange. The study first investigates the impact 
of corporate governance on intellectual capital, to find out which corporate governance factor 
significantly affects the intellectual capital and then the study investigates the impact of 
intellectual capital on financial performance. These relationships are assessed by using sample of 
Banks listed in Pakistan stock exchange. Literature suggests three most preferred industries of 
Information technology, Pharmaceuticals and Banking & Finance to investigate the effect of 
intellectual capital on firm’s performance (Vishnu & Gupta, 2014). The present study responds 
to the calls made by Sharbati et al. (2010), Sueyoshi et al. (2010) and Makki & Lodhi (2014), 
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who had suggested using single sector to reduce the heterogeneity in data and using weighted 
least square to control cross-sectional and time series effects. The study classified the banks into 
two groups that are commercial Banks and Microfinance & Investment banks. The classification 
improves the significance of results because the two groups have different business scope and 
interests. The results also visualize the effect of variation in code of corporate governance on the 
level of intellectual capital and financial performance in both classes of the banks. 
 
2. Literature Review 
The study sheds light on corporate governance and intellectual capital and their relationship with 
each other and with financial performance. Due to the theoretical and descriptive nature of 
variables, literature review focuses on theoretical and empirical reviews.  
 
2.1 Theoretical Review 
2.1.1 Corporate Governance  
Before the information and technological developments, modern business concepts and modern 
infrastructure, most of the companies were small and family owned. There were no separate 
concepts for ownership, corporate governance, administration and management. But after 
industrialization and modern inventions, companies started expansion in their businesses and 
introduced new channels to make access easy to suppliers and consumers to face the global 
competition (Laing & Weir, 1999). This race developed the concept of “complex ownership 
structure” which created a separation between ownership and management (Korac-Kakabadse et 
al., 2001). These complexities and the subsequent occurrences of incidents in the companies 
provided provide a path for a formal and separate system to direct and control a company, hence 
the birth of corporate governance. 
La-Porta (2000) referred corporate governance to all mechanisms, which assure protection to 
investors against sinking and theft of their funds and returns by internal management. Shah 
(2009) documented that corporate governance meaning and concepts vary from country to 
country. For example in the Anglo-American countries it refers to a system which focuses on 
investor’s interests, while in European countries it includes all stakeholders of a company 
(Goergen et al., 2005). According to modern thoughts corporate governance includes all public 
and private institutions, which have a common goal of governing the rights and responsibilities 
of management and investors. These institutions cover country corporate laws, Boards of 
companies, accepted and prevailing business practices and ethics, securities regulations and 
listing requirements of stock market.  
Thus, various types of ownerships lead to concept of agency problem because of the gap between 
owners and management (Vinten., 2000). Good corporate governance practices assure easy 
access to external financing and also have the ability to effectively use these funds to boost up 
firm’s value (Javed, et al., 2006). In current competitive world, management needs to make 
decisions quickly while keeping in view all threats, weaknesses and strength of the company 
(Shyu, 2013). According to O’Connor and Byrne (2015) corporate governance needs vary with 
different levels of firm’s life cycle, therefore, firms need to have a flexible mechanism of 
governance to live successfully and achieve their objectives efficiently and effectively. In this 
regard, corporate governance acts as a front line for any organization, because each investor 
firstly examines the mechanism and quality of governance (Dalwai et al., 2015) and then invests 
in a company where board is working lawfully and ethically in the best interest of shareholders.  
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2.1.2 Corporate Governance in Pakistan 
Pakistan had a small corporate sector at the time of its independence. Indian Companies 
Consolidation Act 1913 was inherited by Pakistan to control and regulate companies. 
Amendments were made to this act in 1949, to meet the requirements of companies and to make 
control effective and name was changed to Companies Act, 1913. Later, Security and Exchange 
Ordinance, 1969 and Companies Act, 1984 were promulgated to supervise and regulate working 
of companies. In 1997, a separate commission Securities and Exchange Commission (SECP) was 
constituted in pursuance of Security and Exchange commission Act, 1997. This Commission 
formally started operations on 1
st
 January 1999. SECP started working under umbrella of 
Security and Exchange Commission Act, 1997, and issued for the first time comprehensive code 
of corporate governance in Pakistan on 28
th
 March 2002. The Code included special amendments 
in Securities and Exchange Commission Ordinance, 1969; Companies Ordinance, 1984; SECP 
Ordinance, 1997 and assistance of other regulators like State Bank of Pakistan, World Bank, 
Asian Development Bank and Stock exchanges. Specific amendments related to output of code 
of corporate governance, were made in 2012 and 2013 in the SECP act. For better and effective 
control the Commission is divided in sub divisions, departments and wings. Besides SECP, there 
also exist other authorities, which regulate and control specific companies. For example stock 
exchange regulates listed companies in certain aspects; State Bank of Pakistan has authority to 
provide guideline for banking companies and financial institutions; National Electric Power 
Regulatory Authority (NEPRA) has authority to regulate companies generating or distributing 
electric power; Oil and Gas Development Authority provides assistance and keep control of oil 
and gas companies; and Pakistan Telecommunication Authority (PTA) has authority of 
supervision of all companies in Pakistan which provide telecommunication services. 
SECP in collaboration with Economic Affairs Division of Pakistan and UNDP lunched a project 
in August, 2002 to make sure the implementation of code of corporate governance. In 2007, 
SECP in collaboration with Pakistan institute of Corporate Governance (PICG) and IFC 
conducted a survey to analyze corporate governance in Pakistan. The survey included financial 
institutions, local listed firms in stock exchange and some non-listed firms. The survey results 
concluded that there is a lack of awareness among companies regarding corporate governance. 
Therefore, to increase awareness of benefits of code of corporate governance, SECP with IFC 
and PICG held several training workshops for management of companies. SECP also helped by 
Asian Development Bank and Word Bank in improving the corporate governance standards and 
its implementation. 
 
2.1.3 Intellectual Capital 
The concept of intellectual capital is as old as humans in the world. Two persons possess 
different efficiencies and capabilities and this is the crux of intellectual capital. Initially, there 
was no explicit existence of the concept of intellectual capital, but modernization and 
globalization changed the structure of business entities and overall economy, which provided a 
path for discovery of intellectual capital. The origin of intellectual capital was found during 
exploration of comprehensive measurement of firm’s performance. The base is provided by the 
work of Luca Pacioli in 1494 in finding the tangible assets associated with factors of production, 
his work identified some evidences that value of a company is not exactly equals to its sum of all 
physical and financial assets; however proper exploration of invisible assets is recent (Itami, 
1980).  
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Hiroyuki Itami was the first to publish explicit ground breaking work in 1980 regarding invisible 
assets in Japanese corporations. The phrase “intellectual capital” is firstly used by John Kenneth 
in a letter to Michael Kalecki in 1969. Sveiby was the first to publish book about knowledge 
management in 1986 (Sullivan, 2000). After that many researchers started work on concepts, 
elements, measurements, classification and value of intellectual capital. Sveiby (1997) and 
Sullivan (1990) made contribution in intellectual capital. Stewart (1994), Pulic (1998; 2004), 
Mouritsen (2009), Makki and Lodhi (2009), Dumay and Cauganesan (2013) contributed towards 
the work on intellectual capital and concluded that classification and measurement of intellectual 
capital is very important for any organization. They introduced different measurement models of 
intellectual capital and argued the importance and usefulness of various elements of intellectual 
capital in decision making. Further, they highlighted that certainty in measurement is not 
possible, yet it is necessary because it helps in developing new managerial objects and 
dimensions. 
Intellectual capital has no universally accepted definition. Researchers have defined and 
established its boundaries in their own context. However, they agree on basic elements of IC that 
is experience, knowledge, system, process and relations and brain power of employees come 
under umbrella of intellectual capital. Stewart (1991) dissolves confusion and simplify concept 
of intellectual capital. He documented that intellectual capital has no physical existence but 
contributes in value of an organization. He further explain in his book “Intellectual Capital: The 
New Wealth of Organization” in 1997 that  intellectual capital is the sum of intellectual material, 
experience, knowledge, intellectual property and information that create value and give 
competitive edge to organization. The excess amount of market value over net book value of a 
company has been termed as intellectual capital (Svieby, 1997). Some researchers associate 
intellectual capital to human resources while some relate it with information technology and 
networks (Koenig, 1997), and some referred it to as knowing capability and creativity & work 
efficiency of a society. A Spanish firm, Union Fenosa describes intellectual capital as a set of 
intangible values that develop and promote the profit generation efficiency of a firm now and in 
future (Union Fenosa, 1999).  
These definitions focused on classification of intellectual capital. According to modern thinking, 
intellectual capital is a separate field, and it is impossible to isolate its boundaries but important 
to do classification and measures of its components as most significant factors of production are 
invisible (Usoff et al., 2002). The recent literature focused on identification criteria for 
intellectual capital (Goebel, 2015). Intellectual capital can defined broadly as, all informational 
sources and resources of a company or organization that may contribute profit maximization, 
capturing new customers, improve innovation capability, smooth communication among 
stakeholders and polish the employee efficiency (Giuliani, 2016). 
 
2.1.4 Classification of Intellectual Capital 
Classification of intellectual capital is a hard challenge because the boundaries of its elements are 
loose and cannot be isolated from each other and have a very little inherent logic that describes 
their entities (Mouritsen, 2009). 
Intellectual capital was taken into account by Kaplan and Norton (1992) when they developed 
‘Balance Score Card’ for taking intellectual capital into account. They broadly divided 
intellectual capital in components; internal business operations prospective, financial 
prospective, learning prospective and innovation prospective. Skandia practically first time used 
the term ‘Intellectual capital’ in their annual report by classifying 24 indicators of intellectual 
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capital in five groups: Financial focus, human focus, customer focus, renewal focus and process 
focus (Roos et al., 2007). According to Petrash (1996) intellectual capital is the aggregate of 
three components human capital, organization capital and customer capital. This model provides 
dynamic management of intellectual capital and used by Dow Chemicals in 1996 (Johansson, 
1998). 
Based on these basic models many composite and integrated models of intellectual capital are 
formulated such as Pulic (1998), Riahi-Belkaoui (2003), Ramirez et al. (2007), Mouritsen 
(2009). However, their components of classification directly or indirectly come under heading of 
human and structural capital employed efficiency and relational capital. 
 
2.2 Empirical Review 
A number of empirical studies have analyzed the relationships of corporate governance, 
intellectual capital and firm’s financial performance with mixed results. Some of these studies 
have found positive relationships while others concluded inverse relationships. These variations 
are caused by various factors such as structures of models & methods used and firm specific 
factors. Few studies discussed intellectual capital but failed to catch exact conclusion. 
 
2.2.1 Corporate Governance and Firm’s Performance 
Relationship between corporate governance and firm’s performance has a rich literature, but still 
remain inconclusive and different studies show different results. Some studies show significantly 
positive relationship between corporate governance and firm’s performance (Bhagat et al., 2002; 
Javed, et al., 2006; Tornyeva & Wereko, 2012; Brown & Caylor, 2006; Gompers et al., 2003; 
Dittmar & Mahrt-Smith, 2007; Harjoto & Jo, 2008); while some studies found significantly 
negative relationship between corporate governance and firm performance (Bocean & Barbu, 
2007; Lawrence & Marcus, 2004;  Bhagat & Black, 2002; Drakos & Bekiris, 2010; Basyith, 
2016), and other studies yielded non-significant results (Beiner et al., 2006; Abdullah, 2009; 
Switzer & Tang, 2009). However, majority of the research suggests better performance is the 
result of good governance. 
Mitton (2001) explored projection of corporate governance on firm performance in five countries 
involved in East Asian financial crises and found that stronger corporate governance is very vital 
during unexpected period of economic distress. He further points out that minority shareholders 
protection, high disclosure quality, well managed flow of power & information and a suitable 
ownership structure are key challenges to Good Governance. Sound financial performance and 
higher market valuation and better accounting results are highly correlated with better corporate 
governance mechanism (Klapper & Love, 2004).  
Bhagat and Bolton (2008) while investigating board independence, board ownership, board size 
and CEOs duality in US firms found that stock ownership of board, board size and CEOs duality 
were positively associated with operating performance, while board independence was 
negatively associated with firm’s performance.  Basyith et al. (2015) studied 45 blue chip firms 
in Indonesia and found that board ownership had negative impact on performance, while 
independent commissioner and audit committee had no effect on performance in Indonesian 
context. 
Family ownership and Non-Family ownership also cause fluctuations in firm’s performance. For 
example, Maury (2005) examined 1672 non-financial firms of Western Europe; using panel 
regression analysis, showed family control has non-linear positive effect on Return on Assets and 
Tobin’s Q. Furthermore, he suggested that active family control is associated with higher 
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profitability then non-family firms. Family ownership reduces agency costs in organizations 
(Fama & Jensen, 1983). In a stable and well-regulated economy, family control improves the 
firm’s value (Anderson & Reeb, 2003). While inversely the Family ownership may not provide 
legal security to minority shareholders (Maury, 2006). Yasser et al. (2011) found that there are 
significant differences in family and non-family controlled company’s performance in Pakistan. 
The authors found that independent directors negatively, while directors with professional 
qualification and meetings frequency positively affect the firm’s performance in family 
controlled companies in Pakistan; whereas, director qualification, board composition and 
professionally qualified directors have positive effect in non-family controlled companies in 
Pakistan. 
Arora and Sharma (2016) explored relation of board structure with financial performance in 
Indian firms. He found that board size, outsider directors, proportion of independent directors 
and other corporate governance indicators have insignificant association with ROA, NPM and 
ROE, while board size has positive relation with Tobin’s q and board independence show 
negative relation with Tobin’s q.  
 
2.2.2 Corporate Governance and Intellectual Capital 
Literature provides evidence regarding association between corporate governance and 
intellectual capital. Keenan and Aggestam (2001) conceptualized the relationship of CG and IC. 
They argue that better IC management by directors provides competitive advantage and value 
creation to firms. Corporate Governance monitors and control management to minimize the 
agency problems by cover up and reduce the opportunistic behavior of mangers (Li, et al., 2008). 
Effectiveness level of intellectual and knowledge, skills and experience of directors directly 
affects the corporate governance mechanism (Edvinsson, 2013, p.160).    
Ho and William (2003) analyzed the data of listed companies of three economies (Sweden, 
South Africa and UK) to explore the relationship and interdependency of board structure and 
intellectual capital efficiency. The results show that board of directors is an important factor of 
human capital and intellectual capital efficiency and value added intellectual capital (VAIC) is 
significantly affected by board composition. An empirical analysis conducted by Cerbioni and 
Parbonetti (2007), found that intellectual capital disclosures has positive effect on non-executive 
directors proportion; whereas, board size, board structure and CEO duality have negative 
relationship with disclosures of intellectual capital.  
A recent study by Appuhami and Bhuyan (2015) examined the relationships of corporate 
governance on intellectual capital in service firms of Australia. The results reveal that board 
composition, CEO duality and remuneration committee composition have positive significant 
relation with IC efficiency; while audit committee composition and board size have insignificant 
association with IC. IC not only increases by investment in intangibles but coordination, 
cooperation and competition with other organizations also provide opportunity to create and 
enhance IC. Collective intellectual capital with other firms improves the individual intellectual 
capital of firms (Vale et al., 2016).  
In light of the above discussion following hypotheses are developed.  
H1: Board size has a positive impact on intellectual capital. 
H2: CEO duality has a positive impact on intellectual capital. 
H3: Non-Executive Directors have positive impact on intellectual capital. 
H4: Independent Directors have positive impact on intellectual capital. 
H5: Directors’ Ownership has positive impact on intellectual capital. 
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2.2.3 Intellectual Capital and Financial Performance 
Intellectual capital is a vital invisible driver of firm’s performance. It plays a significant role in 
improving overall performance of firms of various sizes and nature, but it explicitly exists in 
large firms. Firms surviving in developed economies have a formal shape, classification and 
reporting system of their intellectual capital, while small firms and majority of firms in emerging 
economies do not report their intellectual capital in their reports (Pulic, 1998). However, firms of 
developing economies show interest to have knowledge about their intellectual capital efficiency 
(Chen et al., 2008) and its relationship with sustainability (Akhtar, et al. 2015).  
Theoretically, intellectual capital has a strong base while empirically its importance to financial 
performance is still questionable (Bontis, 2001). This may be due to three reasons: First, lack of 
appropriate measurement method for extracting absolute value of intellectual capital; second, 
different analyses are conducted in different contexts and time, results may vary with time, place 
and economical conditions that affect financial terms; third, because of time-delay effect of 
intellectual capital, it is necessary to investigate financial performance of firms after several 
years of investment in intellectual capital (Dženopoljac et al., 2016). 
Most of the empirical studies on intellectual capital are conducted industrial sector wise. Vishnu 
and Gupta (2014) highlight three most preferred industries for empirical investigation effect of 
intellectual capital on firm’s performance: Information Technology, Pharmaceuticals and 
Banking & finance. 
Yong et al., (2009) conducted study on commercial banks of eight Asian countries and found 
that human capital with physical capital plays a role of shield during crisis. Mondal and Gosh 
(2012) found that IC plays a significant role in development of productivity and profitability of 
banks. Moreover, human capital, a major determinant of financial performance is considered in 
Indian banks.    
Sharabati et al., (2010) conducted a survey based study of pharmaceutical industry of Jordan. 
They explored and analyzed the views of middle and top level managers and concluded that 
intellectual capital jointly contributes to business performance. An extensive study conducted by 
Vishnu and Gupta (2014) investigated the Indian pharmaceutical firms to define the relationships 
between indicators of IC and financial performance and proposed some modified VIAC
TM
 
models. Results of their study summarized intellectual capital as having positive effect on the 
firm’s performance; however, Return on Sales (ROS) was less significantly associated with IC.              
Wang et al., (2014) explored the mediating role of intellectual capital between knowledge 
sharing and firm’s operational & financial performance of high technology Chinese firms. The 
study revealed that IC acted as a mediator between knowledge sharing and corporate 
performance; explicit knowledge sharing significantly affected human capital and structural 
capital; while tacit knowledge sharing influenced IC and all the components of IC significantly 
impacted corporate financial and operational performance. Furthermore, in mediating role of IC, 
sharing of tacit knowledge was found to have greater influence on financial performance, while 
sharing of explicit knowledge had stronger positive relation with operational performance. A 
recent study conducted by Cleary and Quinn (2016) also found positive significant relations 
between IC and financial performance of SMEs.   
In conclusion of the studies, it is clear that most of the literature used three dimensional measures 
of intellectual capital; human capital, structural capital and relational capital and VAIC
TM
 is 
frequently used measurement method for IC. 
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Following hypotheses are developed for relationship of intellectual capital and financial 
performance based on the above discussion. 
H6: HCE has positive impact on financial performance 
H7: SCE has positive impact on financial performance 
H8: CEE has positive impact on financial performance 
 
In light of the literature it can be summarized that corporate governance (CG) and Intellectual 
capital (IC) are significant factors to financial performance. Although there exists ample 
literature on corporate governance, intellectual capital and financial performance, but there are 
no ideal standards identified for corporate governance. There are some unobservable firm 
specific factors related to performance of the firm. Therefore, CG influences financial 
performance differently in different countries and even different sectors of the same country are 
influenced differently by the same code of corporate governance. Therefore, each country 
formulates its own code of corporate governance according to its context and betterment of 
corporate sector. The recent direction of research about corporate governance is to search the 
linkage of IC with CG and financial performance. It is confirmed that CG and IC are significant 
factors to financial performance; however, there is lack of empirical evidences about their 
structural links. 
 
3. Methodology 
3.1 Sample and Data  
A panel data set of 27 listed banks with time series of 2008-2015 is used for empirical analysis. 
However, there are more than 50 banks listed in Pakistan Stock Exchange, but in the present 
study only those commercial and Microfinance & Investment banks are included which operated 
in the mentioned period with same name. The data of variables are extracted from annual reports 
of the banks. Moreover, the banks are divided into two groups (commercial banks and 
Microfinance & investment banks), and data is analyzed separately for both the groups. Group of 
commercial Banks included 19 Banks, while Microfinance & investment banks included 8 
banks. 
 
3.2 Econometric Model 
The study first investigates the impact of corporate governance on intellectual capital and then 
impact of intellectual capital on financial performance. Following expressions show the general 
form of the econometric model used. 
 
Corporate Governance (CG) and Intellectual Capital (IC) 
To check the impact of CG on IC, we have used the following models. The models are also used 
by Ho and William (2003), Appuhami and Bhuyan (2015), however, the model is modified with 
inclusion of control variables and replacement of different indicators of corporate governance. 
 
VAICit= α + β1BSit + β2CDit + β3NonEDit + β4INDit + β5OwnDit + β6Sizeit + β7LVit + Uit 
 
3.2.1 IC and Financial performance 
To check the impact of components of intellectual capital on each measure of financial 
performance following models are developed which are used by Yong et al., (2009), Mondal and 
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Gosh (2012) and Wang et al., (2014); however, these models are modified by adding controlled 
variables. 
 
ROAit= α + β1HCEit + β2SCEit + β3CEEit+ β4Sizeit+ β5LVit + Uit 
 
ROEit= + β1HCEit + β2SCEit + β3CEEit+ β4Sizeit+ β5LVit + Uit 
 
Tobin’s qit = + β1HCEit + β2SCEit + β3CEEit+ β4Sizeit+ β5LVit + Uit 
 
3.2.2 Diagnostic Tests 
Modified Wald test is commonly used for checking the heteroscedasticity in variances of 
residuals because it takes into account the group specific effects of panel data (Maury, 2005). 
Similarly, Wooldridge test is appropriate for checking the auto correlation in residuals in panel 
data as it considers the cross-section specific effects (Gujrati, 2004). The results of both the test 
show that heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation exists in the pooled data. 
 
                           H0 : δi
2
 =  δ
2
for all i 
                          H1:  δi
2≠  δ
2
for all i 
 
 
 
                     H0: There is no autocorrelation 
                     H1: There is auto correlation 
 
3.2.3 Estimation Method 
Keep in view the diagnostic tests of data we can easily observe that simple OLS cannot be BLUE 
estimator for the data. Any model of panel data is not considered same as in case of Time series 
data and cross section data, because it tag to have two subscripts- i and t – where i shows 
individual/ unit of analysis and t represents time dimension (Baltagi, 2008). The error term of 
Panel model consists of three components – Individual specific effects (µi), time specific effect 
(λt) and other disturbance (vit). 
                                                              Yit = αit +βit X + Uit 
Where Uit= µi + λt + vit 
µi= Cross section effects 
λt= Time specific effects 
vit= other random errors 
 
Modified Wald Test 
chi2 (28)   8833.7 
Prob>chi2     0.0000 
Wooldridge Test 
F-stat 5.3974 
P-value 0.0002 
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On the basis of these unique effects of panel data, two different models are there to deal with 
cross-sectional effects: 
1. Fixed Effect model  
2. Random effect model 
 
3.2.4 Fixed Effect Model 
Fixed effect mode allows different intercepts for each cross-section included in the study, which 
allows heterogeneity of each cross-section to have its own intercept; the word “fixed” is used 
because the intercept may differ across each cross-section but remains fixed over time (Gujarati 
& Porter, 2009). Moreover, the fixed effect assumed cross-section effect (µi) to be fixed 
parameter, and to avoid dummy-trap (perfect multicollinearity) the dummy variable is introduced 
to take one cross-section as base – that is obtaining no. of cross-section -1 dummies (Baltagi, 
2008, p.14). 
The equation for fixed effect with cross-sections dummy can be specified as: 
                                                Yit=  αi + β1Xit + + uit 
Where αi = α1, α2, α3, . . . . .αn; and n is number of cross-sections. 
The fixed effect model assumes that the covariance between independent variables and cross-
sectional specific effects is not equals to zero. 
                                                     Cov (uit / Xit) ≠ 0 
Gujarati & Porter (2009) also provide an alternative way to adjust the fixed effects by obtaining 
“de-meaned values or mean corrected values”. In this method fixed effect are adjusted by 
differencing the sample values from the sample means of each cross-section (p.599). This model 
can be specified as follows: 
                                                             Yit=  α + β1Xit + uit 
The fixed effect mode with dummy variables is useful in comparison of cross-sections 
(Ballotage, 2008) but to avoid too many factors, which reduce the degree freedom, fixed effect 
through difference is useful. The study is not interested in comparison of cross-sections, 
therefore, fixed effect mode with difference method is used. 
 
3.2.5 Random Effect Model 
The fixed effect model has too much parameters (explanatory variables + dummy), which cause 
reduction of degree of freedom. To avoid this, cross-section effect (µI) can be assumed 
(Ballotage, 2008, p.17). The random effect model allows a single intercept based on mean value 
of all the intercepts and differences in the intercepts of different cross-section become part of 
error term. In more detail, the  intercept of each cross section in fixed effect model is equal to 
sum of common intercept in random effect and if (random error term). This model is most 
appropriate when random sample is extracted from a large population. The random effect model 
assumes that there is no association between cross section specific effects and independent 
variables. 
                                                   Cov (uit / Xit) = 0 
The general model of Random effect can be expressed as: 
 
                                                                Yit=  αit + β1Xit + uit 
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Where αit is value of intercept with mean value of all intercepts in fixed effect model. And it can 
be presented for each entity as: 
αit = αi + vit 
3.2.6 Hausman test 
Fixed effect and random effect models are associated with panel structured data set. It is not easy 
to choose which one is best for a specific data set, especially when number of cross section is 
greater than number of time series (Gujarati & Porter, 2009). Hausman (1978) provides test for 
selection of random and fixed effect model. The random effects model is appropriate for data if 
Ho is accepted, and fixed effect model if null Hypothesis is rejected, but the philosophy of the 
test is that it compare the results of OLS and De-meaned estimates (Baltagi, 2008, p.22 ). The 
null Hypotheses of the test is H0: E(uit / Xit) = 0, under random effect model where cross-section 
effects are part of uit , The acceptance of the null Hypotheses means error term are uncorrelated 
with  independent variable, hence independent variables do not vary with respect to cross 
section- and therefore random effect is appropriate, while the rejection of the test shows some 
independent variables correlated with error term which leads to endogeneity problem and hence 
fixed effect model is appropriate (Baltagi, 2008, p.72). 
 
3.3. Model Specifications 
Diagnostic tests confirm that data has the problems of heteroscedasticity, autocorrelation and 
endogeneity. Moreover, some independent variables are not linearly associated with dependent 
variables. Therefore, for the empirical model Generalized Least Square (GLS) and Generalized 
Method of Moment (GMM) are used in the study to address the above mentioned problems. 
GMM is only applied to combined model which includes all the components of IC and CG 
where endogeneity is serious problem. 
 
3.3.1 Generalized Least Square (GLS) 
In field of finance and economics usually OLS estimator for coefficients considered not best 
because it does not take into account the groups variations; more specifically it provide no detail 
information about variations occurred cross-sectional wise or time series (Gujrati, 2004). 
Addition of weight with respect to different groups make it become BLUE estimator but now it 
named as “Weighted Least Square” or “Generalized Least square”. GLS includes the variances 
of different groups to control cross-section specific variations.  
 
∑ wt Ui
2 = ∑ wt (Yi - βˆ1 - βˆ2Xi)
2
 
Where wt = 1/δi
2
 
For the study, GLS equation can be expressed as  
 
                                                                    Yit = αit + βxit + witUit 
Where Yit  represents the dependent variable which is financial performance and VAIC while Xi 
represents independent variable which are CG and IC in above mentioned equations. 
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3.3.2 Remedial for Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelation in GLS 
To adjust the heteroscedasticity problem due to cross section specific effects and autocorrelation 
problem due to time series effects, GLS weights are included in the model, and also taken into 
consideration the fixed effects and random effects of cross-sections. 
 
 
   
   
  
  
   
    
  
   
]
2 
Table 1: Measurements 
 Name of 
variable 
Symbol Measurement 
Dependent 
Variable 
Financial 
performance 
Return on 
Asset 
ROA                 187   187                 
                          
 
 Return on 
Equity 
ROE                 187   187             
                   
 
Tobin’s q Tobin’s 
q 
                  187        
            
 
Independent 
variable 
Corporate 
governance 
Board size BS Total number of board members 
  CEO 
duality 
CD 1=CEO dual role exist 
0= otherwise 
Non-
executive 
directors 
NonED                                           
                              
 
     
Independen
t directors 
IND                                         
                              
 
     
Directors 
Ownership 
OwnD                  
                  
     
Intellectual 
Capital 
Human 
capital 
efficiency 
HCE   
  
 
 Structural 
capital 
efficiency 
SCE   
  
 
 
Capital 
employed 
efficiency 
CEE   
  
 
Value 
added 
intellectual 
coefficient 
VAIC             
Control Variables Bank size Size Ln (total assets) 
Leverage Lv Total debts/book value of equity 
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4. Results and Discussion 
Descriptive statistics is performed to visualize the nature, trend and dispersion of distribution of 
each variable to provide a snapshot of the data covering period from 2008-2015. The table 2 
shows the summary of descriptive statistics of each variable. 
 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
Variables 
Commercial Banks Micro Finance & Investment Banks 
Mean  Maximum  Minimum  Std. dev   Mean Maximum Minimum Std. dev 
 ROA 1.1342 34.6778 -6.1528 3.2824 -3.5616 25.11459 -34.8768 8.9179 
 ROE 8.2909 100.1582 
-
198.9325 30.4689 
-
31.3413 503.1162 
-
1459.2242 204.7951 
 
TOBINQ 1.9084 24.7409 0.1132 3.6306 0.9923 2.2514 0.3532 0.2803 
 HCE 4.9968 11.5186 0.6592 2.1298 3.0502 25.4582 -1.9538 3.9922 
 SCE 0.7478 0.9132 -0.5173 0.1782 -0.1862 10.5879 -8.9145 2.6099 
 CEE 0.7045 4.7683 0.0256 0.5543 18.4702 205.9699 -0.8086 42.0163 
 BS 8.5024 13 6 1.1353 7.5278 10 5 1.1003 
CD 0.0264 1 0 0.1607 0.03 1 0 0.1454 
 NonED 59.5023 85.7143 18.1819 15.6918 58.8512 87.5 12.5 19.6658 
 IND 20.6733 75 0 0.1789 21.47 71.43 0 0.1947 
 OwnD 6.2652 67.5 0 12.4992 16.7748 81.33 0.001 18.5913 
 SIZE 11.4903 76.7509 0.0687 8.6612 8.4907 12.2222 5.2635 1.8009 
 LEV 11.49 76.75 0.07 8.66 8.7775 121.805 -12.7355 17.7827 
 
Table 3 shows the regression results of CG and IC. Corporate governance shows stronger 
relationships with IC than with financial performance. It has adjusted R-square of 47% with 
ROA, 61% with ROE and 57% with Tobin’s q in commercial banks, while 45% with ROA, 52% 
with ROE and 44% with Tobin’s q in micro finance and investment banks as shown in table 4.7. 
While on the other hand CG has adjusted R-squared of 71% with VAIC in commercial banks and 
70% in micro finance and investment banks. While at the sequence IC has stronger relations with 
financial performance than CG. These results validate the mediation effect of IC between CG 
and financial performance. 
Board size (BS) has positive impact on VAIC in both groups of bank, but insignificant in large 
banks and significant in micro finance and investment banks at 5% level of significance, which 
indicate that board size significantly improves the VAIC in micro finance and investment banks, 
and accept the accept H1 in light of the results. These results are in line with the findings of 
William (2003) and contradictory to Cerbioni & Parbonetti (2007). 
Coefficient of CEO duality (CD) is positive with VAIC but insignificant in both commercial 
banks and micro finance and investment banks. Hence H2 is not accepted at 5% level of 
significance. Same results are provided by Tseng and Lin (2010). Although literature give 
importance to CD in less developed countries but here the insignificant relationship may be due 
to existence of very few cases of duality in the data set.  
Proportion of non-executive directors (NonED) and Independent director (IND) has positive and 
significant relationship with VAIC at 5% in commercial banks. This indicates that proportion of 
nonexecutive directors on board increase the VAIC significantly and is in line with the study  of 
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Tseng & Lin (2010), who found that board independence measured by NonED and IND improve 
the intellectual capital of company. Board independence may create agency problems but enable 
effective monitoring and control system and hence improve the HCE and overall IC efficiency 
(Makki & Lodhi, 2014). The case is slightly different for micro finance and investment banks. 
Here in micro finance and investment banks, NonED has negative impact but insignificant to 
VAIC, which may indicate that in micro finance and investment banks, NonED cause increase in 
expenses but do not increase value creation accordingly. In light of these results H3 is accepted 
only in case of commercial banks and H4 is accepted in case of both groups of banks. 
 
Table 3: Regression Results (CG & IC) 
  Commercial Banks Micro finance and investment banks 
Variable Coefficient Prob.   Coefficient Prob.   
C 8.194 0.000 -12.962 0.000 
BS 0.089 (0.002)*** 0.485 (0.021)** 
CD 0.601 0.564 2.076 0.652 
NonED 0.019 (0.023)** -0.014 (0.095)* 
IND 0.452 (0.010)** 2.294 (0.049)** 
OwnD -0.017 0.378 0.056 (0.008)*** 
SIZE -0.258 0.127 1.419 (0.000)*** 
LEV 0.031 (0.015)** 0.012 0.435 
R-squared 0.796 
 
0.754 
Adjusted R-squared 0.715 
 
0.701 
F-statistics 8.677 
 
12.997 
Prob (F-stat) 0.000 
 
0.000 
Hausman test (chi-sq) 17.321 
 
36.451 
P-value (chi-square) 0.009 
 
0.001 
 
Controlled variables show positive but insignificant impact on VAIC with combination of CG in 
commercial banks, while in case of micro finance and investment banks size positively 
associated with VAIC. The percentage ownership of directors has negative but insignificant 
impact on VAIC in case of commercial banks, while positive and significant in case of 
Microfinance and investment banks. Therefore H5 is only accepted in case of Microfinance and 
investment banks. 
Table 4 shows the regression results of financial performance measured by ROA, ROE and 
Tobin’s q regressed by component of IC that is human capital efficiency (HCE), structural 
capital efficiency (SCE) and capital employed efficiency (CEE), of commercial banks for period 
2008 to 2015. The results show that components of IC cause significant variation in financial 
performance. HCE has negative and statistically significant coefficient in case of ROA and 
Tobin’s q while it has negative but insignificant impact on ROE, suggested that investment in 
more human capital negatively impact the financial performance measured by ROA, ROE and 
Tobin’s q. These results are contradictory to the studies of Mondal and Gosh (2012) and Vishnu 
and Gupta (2014) who argue that human capital is major contributor to financial performance. 
This may be due to losses suffered by some banks like BOP, NIB and Bank Islami. 
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On the other side, SCE has positive significant and significant impact with ROA and ROE, 
means that invest more in structural capital improve the accounting performance. The results are 
consistent with Shiu (2006). Coefficient of SCE is negative with financial performance measured 
by Tobin’s q, at 5% level of significance, suggest that SCE improve the accounting performance 
but declines the market value. Most of the commercial banks focus to improve their accounting 
performance with improvement in SCE, and negative relationship with Tobin’s q is support by 
data set itself that average SCE get increase from 2008 to 2015 while average value of Tobin’s q 
touch peak in 2011 and 2012 and then show slight decrease to 2015. Keep in view the results H6 
is not accepted while H7 is accepted at 5% level of significance in case of commercial banks. 
 
Table 4: Regression Results (IC & FP for Commercial Banks) 
Commercial Banks 
  ROA ROE Tobin's q 
Variable Coefficient Prob.   Coefficient Prob.   Coefficient Prob.   
C -9.488 0.003 -12.171 0.000 1.312 0.034 
HCE -0.193 (0.047)** -3.393 (0.093)* -0.079 (0.004)*** 
SCE 3.163 (0.002)*** 21.444 (0.000)*** -0.275 (0.003)*** 
CEE 19.614 (0.001)*** 24.200 (0.001)*** 12.974 (0.006)*** 
Size 0.691 (0.000)*** 13.264 (0.001)*** 0.027 0.564 
Lv -0.063 (0.001)*** -2.618 (0.002)*** -0.001 0.163 
R-squared 0.726   0.719   0.684 
Adjusted R-squared 0.680   0.662   0.609 
F-statistics 19.448   6.243   30.860 
Prob(F-stat) 0.000   0.000   0.000 
Hausman test (chi-sq) 2.498   23.321   31.324 
P-value (chi-square) 0.777   0.000   0.000 
 
Results provide evidence that CEE is most effective component of IC that contribute in financial 
performance measured by ROA, ROE and Tobin’s q. Coefficient of CEE is positive and 
significant at 5% level of significance with all the indicators of financial performance, which 
emphasize that higher value of CEE enable banks to have higher ROA, ROE and Tobin’s q, and 
hence H8 is accepted.  
To summarize, it may be concluded that the commercial banks focus to improve their 
performance by using policies that enhance SCE and CEE and make it easier to access by 
customers and brings automations by investing in technological capital, which is a part of SCE. 
HCE is a significant contributor that develops the other two components of IC (Jardon & Martos, 
2009) but in the current study, the negative impact may be due to losses of some banks for some 
years that impact inversely HCE by placing lower value of value added against larger human 
capital. 
The results also provide evidence that controlled variables (size and leverage) also have 
significant relations with financial performance indicators ROA and ROE but insignificant 
association with Tobin’s q. Size shows positive significant effect with ROA and ROE which 
shows that larger the size, larger will be ROA and ROE with combination of components of IC. 
Inversely, Leverage (Lv) has negative significant coefficient with ROA and ROE, which may be 
due to use of more debt, the banks also have higher interest expense.  
Pakistan Administrative Review 
Vol. 1, No. 3, 2017 
 
191 
 
Table 5 shows the empirical results for financial performance of micro finance and investment 
banks regressed by components of IC HCE, SCE and CEE. In micro finance and investment 
banks the results are different as of commercial banks. The coefficient of HCE is positive with 
all indicators of financial performance, suggesting that HCE is an important component to 
improve financial performance in micro finance and investment banks. These results are 
supported by the studies of Jardon and Martos (2009), Phusavat et al. (2011). The coefficient of 
HCE is positive with ROA and significant at 5% level of significance. Similarly, HCE has 
positive impact on ROE which is significant at 10% level of significance. At the same time, HCE 
has positive and significant coefficient in case of Tobin’s q, which shows that increase in HCE, 
tends to improve the market performance of micro finance and investment banks. 
 
Table 5: Regression Results (IC & FP of Microfinance and Investment Banks) 
Micro Finance and Investment Banks 
  ROA ROE Tobin's q 
Variable Coefficient Prob. Coefficient Prob. Coefficient Prob. 
C -4.654 0.520 0.389 0.992 1.591 0.000 
HCE 0.615 (0.013)** 0.947 (0.077)* 0.009 (0.004)*** 
SCE -0.174 0.463 0.684 0.163 0.021 0.269 
CEE 14.402 (0.002)*** 21.885 (0.002)*** -0.550 (0.005)*** 
Size 0.389 0.635 13.181 (0.000)*** -0.090 (0.001)*** 
Lv -0.042 0.239 -8.310 (0.001)*** 0.000 0.938 
R-squared 0.473 
 
0.601 
 
0.656 
Adjusted R-squared 0.410 
 
0.511 
 
0.579 
F-statistics 2.098 
 
6.716 
 
8.513 
Prob (F-stat) 0.004 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
Hausman test (chi-sq) 20.320 
 
9.550 
 
15.164 
P-value (chi-square) 0.000 
 
0.039 
 
0.010 
 
In case of micro finance and investment banks, SCE has insignificant relationship with all of 
three indicators of financial performance. This shows that micro finance and investment banks 
do not focus on SCE on improving SCE; it may be due to the small financial resources. In light 
of the above results H6 is accepted while H7 is not accepted. CEE has positive and significant 
impact on all three indicators of financial performance ROA, ROE and Tobin’s q at 5% level of 
significance, which means that CEE is a major component of IC to contribute in financial 
performance. CEE has positive significant relationship with financial performance in both 
classes of banks, and therefore H8 is accepted. 
Size of bank (size) has positive but insignificant relation with ROA and positive significant 
relation with ROE, suggesting that banks have more assets and higher accounting performance. 
While the coefficient of size is negative significant with Tobin’s q at level of 5%. Another 
control variable leverage (Lv) has negative relationship with all three proxies for financial 
performance that is use of more debts negatively influences the financial performance, which 
may indicate that the micro finance and investment banks have lower ability to utilize the debts 
and suffer only its expenses.  
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5. Conclusion 
The core objective of the study was to investigate the relationship of corporate governance (CG), 
intellectual capital (IC) and financial performance (FP) in banks listed in Pakistan stock 
exchange. The data of 27 banks are used for empirical analysis. Due to difference in nature and 
scope of business the banks are divided into two groups: Commercial Banks and Microfinance & 
investment banks and the results are extracted separately for each group. GLS technique is 
applied to estimate the model. Results show that corporate governance has significant and 
positive impact on intellectual capital in both groups of banks, however, there is difference in 
significant factors of corporate governance for each group. At the same time intellectual capital 
also has significant positive impact on financial performance. Micro finance and investment 
banks are found to take the advantage of Human Capital Efficiency (HCE), while large banks 
improve their performance with the help of Structural Capital Efficiency (SCE). Capital 
Employed Efficiency (CEE) is found to be a significant factor in both groups of banks.  
Board independence is concentrated factor in view of intellectual capital and hence financial 
performance. In the banking sector, board independence tends to have a higher intellectual 
capital and hence better performance. Those banks which maintain higher ratio of independent 
directors will have better financial performance. Board independence increases expenses of a 
company but enable a good controlling system to formulate policies and procedures to reduce the 
agency problems between management and owners. Similarly, Board ownership also shows 
significant association with intellectual capital. 
The findings also validate and contribute towards Stakeholders theory, which takes into account 
all types of relational networks of a company. It has been seen that corporate governance 
improves the IC efficiency and structural capital efficiency. Hence, it is most significant factor in 
commercial banks. Structural capital is the combination of Relational capital and Organizational 
capital; therefore, we can say that large banks improve their performance by investing more in 
relational capital and give importance to all parties associated with the company. The structural 
capital efficiency management also makes it easy to approach outside resources, which support 
Resource Dependency Theory. 
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